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A. Attorneys' Minimum Fee Schedules Do Not Violate Antitrust
Laws-Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3426 (Oct. 29, 1974) (No. 74-70).
Perhaps the most significant decision rendered by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in the past year was Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.' The case
arose when plaintiffs, in need of a title search, contacted numerous
attorneys in the Northern Virginia area to secure legal services at the
lowest possible cost. Plaintiffs, however, were unable to secure these
services for less than the cost prescribed in a Minimum Fee Sched-
ule,2 which had been promulgated by the Fairfax County Bar Associa-
tion pursuant to guidelines set forth by the Virginia State Bar. Con-
tending that the State Bar and the Fairfax County Bar Association
were violating the Sherman Antitrust Act' in promulgating' and
adopting the fee schedule, plaintiffs instituted a class action for tre-
ble damages on behalf of themselves and other homeowners in their
community.5
The Review acknowledges the contribution of research in the preparation of this
Comment by Killis T. Howard, student at the Washington & Lee School of Law.
1 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3246 (Oct. 29, 1974) (No.
74-70). For a discussion of the issues presented in Goldfarb, see Note, Minimum Fee
Schedules v. Antitrust: The Goldfarb Affair, 45 Miss. L.J. 162 (1974); Note, Minimum
Fee Schedules: An Antitrust Problem, 48 Tui. L. Rav. 682 (1974); Note, Goldfarb
Fights the Bar, 27 Sw. L.J. 524 (1973); Note, Trade Regulation-Attorneys'Minimum
Fee Schedules-A Violation of the Sherman Act, 9 WAKE FORaTT L. Rzv. 616 (1973).
2 The "Minimum Fee Schedule" was described as being "advisory" only. How-
ever, the schedule states that "consistent and intentional violation of the suggested
minimum fee schedule for the purposes of increasing business can, under given circum-
stances constitute solicitation" and can result in disciplinary action. 497 F.2d at 4.
Specifically, it was asserted that the promulgation and adoption of the Mini-
mum Fee Schedule were in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1 (1973). This section provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. .. ."
In addition to setfing forth general guidelines for a Minimum Fee Schedule, the
Virginia State Bar stated that consistent violation of such a schedule might warrant
disciplinary action as a breach of the State's code of ethics. On May 28, 1971, the State
Bar reaffirmed its right to bring such disciplinary action. At the time of the suit,
however, no such action had ever been brought. 497 F.2d at 4 (4th Cir. 1974).
5 Clayton Antitrust Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973) provides in pertinent part: "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
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The district court held that the Minimum Fee Schedules consti-
tuted a form of price fixing.' The court also noted that since price
fixing was per se an unreasonable restraint of trade, the fee schedule
was in violation of the Sherman Act unless some recognized exemp-
tion was applicable to the present defendants. In rendering a judg-
ment for the defendant State Bar, the court held that it was exempt
from the application of the Sherman Act because its participation in
connection with the fee schedule was a form of "state action."' How-
ever, the district court held that the Fairfax County Bar Association
was not so exempted and thus was guilty of a violation of the Sher-
man Act.'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
as it applied to the Virginia Bar, but reversed the lower court's hold-
ing that the local bar association was guilty of a Sherman Act viola-
tion. In affirming the judgment in favor of the State Bar, the circuit
court considered the scope of the state action exemption to the Sher-
man Act.' The court noted that such an exemption was sanctioned
by the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.'" In that
case the court stated that the Sherman Act applied only to actions
of private individuals and not to actions of any of the states, whether
judicial or legislative." The Fourth Circuit construed Parker as hold-
ing that three factors must be satisfied in order for the state action
exemption to be applicable. Specifically, the court held that a pro-
in the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
For a discussion of the state action doctrine as an antitrust defense, see note 9
infra.
355 F. Supp. at 495.
The state action defense is based upon the fact that Congress did not specifically
make the provisions of the Sherman Act applicable to the states and their officers and
agents. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943). As pointed out in Parker, no
constitutional barrier exists to Congress extending the Sherman Act so as to eliminate
the defense. Id. For a recent discussion of the state action doctrine as a defense to
antitrust suits, see Simmons and Foraciari, State Regulation As An Antitrust De-
fense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 42 U. CN. L. REV. 61 (1974). See
also Kinter and Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23 AM. U.
L. Rav. 527 (1974).
10 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
" Parker involved a California state marketing program enacted for the declared
purpose of conserving the agricultural wealth of the State and preventing economic
waste. In effect, the program regulated and restricted competition among the growers
so as to maintain prices. The controversy in Parker focused on this practical effect as
the plaintiff, a producer-packer, contended that the program was a violation of the
Sherman Act. In rejecting plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court set forth the state
action defense. 317 U.S. at 350-52.
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gram, allegedly valid as a form of state action, must be of public
benefit, must be actively supervised by the state, and must receive
its efficacy from some legislative command. The court in Goldfarb
held that since the three requirements were satisfied as to the State
Bar's connection with the fee schedule, it was exempt from the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the State Bar's principal involve-
ment with the Minimum Fee Schedule consisted of its threat, con-
tained in various advisory opinions, to discipline anyone who consis-
tently violated the fee schedule, on the ground that such a practice
was a breach of the state's code of ethics. 2 The court further noted
that the code of ethics, while benefitting lawyers, was designed pri-
marily "to protect the rights and interests of clients and to instill
public confidence in the legal profession and our system of justice."13
Thus the court concluded that the first requirement set forth in
Parker was satisfied. The Fourth Circuit then considered whether the
State Bar's involvement with the fee schedule was authorized by
legislative command. The court found this requirement also to be
satisfied by a statute which gave the Virginia Supreme Court the
power to restrict competition among those in the legal profession. 4
The third requirement of Parker, that the program be actively super-
vised by independent state officials, posed a more troublesome prob-
lem. The court, however, relied on the Fourth Circuit case of
Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC" and found that inde-
pendent state supervision over the State Bar's activities did exist.
The court read Asheville for the proposition that a state could allow
those persons subject to controls to ,participate in the regulation,
provided their activity was adequately supervised by independent
officials. Thus the court dismissed as insignificant the fact that the
State Bar was composed of those to be regulated. The Fourth Circuit
found that since the Virginia Supreme Court has the authority to
regulate and supervise the State Bar,"6 the required independant su-
pervision was present. Consequently, the court held that the State
Bar was exempt from the Sherman Act in the present case.
12 See note 4 supra.
" 497 F.2d at 9.
" Va. Code Ann. § 54-59 (1974) authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to
"prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations organizing and govern-
ing the association known as the Virginia State Bar, composed of attorneys-at-law of
this State, to act as an administrative agency of the Court. .. ."
15 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). In Asheville, the court refusedto apply the Parker
exemption to local tobacco boards of trade. Id. at 509.
" See note 14 supra.
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Addressing the allegations against the Fairfax County Bar Asso-
ciation, the Fourth Circuit noted that although the Minimum Fee
Schedule benefitted the public generally, there was no state supervi-
sion or legislative command to bring the local bar association within
the Parker exemption. 7 The court thus found it necessary to consider
the Association's contention that it was not subject to the federal
anti-trust laws by virtue of its being a "learned profession." 8
The court in Goldfarb declared that the learned profession exemp-
tion was based on two Supreme Court cases 9 which stand for the
proposition that one engaged in a learned profession is not engaged
in a trade and thus not engaged in commerce. Noting that recent
decisions of the Supreme Court refused to address the current valid-
ity of the learned profession exemption,"0 the Fourth Circuit still
found no reason to hold that the exemption should not apply in
appropriate cases.2' Thus, the learned profession exemption was held
to be applicable to the local bar. However, the court further held that
the exemption was applicable only insofar as the association's actions
affected a restraint of trade among attorneys.22 Any restraint of com-
petition extending beyond the learned profession would constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act. As to the legality of the effect that the
Minimum Fee Schedule had on the public generally, the court fo-
17 497 F.2d 1, 12 (4th Cir. 1974).
" In describing the learned profession exemption, the Fourth Circuit stated:
Throughout the development of federal antitrust law there has
been judicial recognition of a limited exclusion of "learned profes-
sions" from the scope of the antitrust laws. This exclusion is not a
favor bestowed upon professionals by the courts as a "professional
courtesy;" the exclusion arises from the language of the statutes and
the peculiar nature of the services rendered.
Id. at 13.
'1 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (construing Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 45 with reference to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et. seq.); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
0 For this proposition, the court cited American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943) in which the Supreme Court stated: "Much argument has been
addressed to the question whether a physician's practice of his profession constitutes
trade under § 3 of the Sherman Act . . . . [W]e need not consider or decide this
question." Id. at 528. The court in Goldfarb also cited United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) wherein the Supreme Court stated: "We do
not intimate an opinion on the correctness of the application of the term [trade] to
the professions." Id. at 491.
21 Id. at 14. The Fourth Circuit cited several lower courts which recognized and
applied the learned profession exemption.
2 The court cited no authority for limiting the learned profession defense to the
profession itself.
